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Canada-China Relations and the Evolving Role of Universities: Toward Partnerships 2.0

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INTRODUCTION

In the sweep of almost a century and a half of Canada-China relations, universities have been a comparatively minor player on an expanding and now busy stage. In a relationship dominated by missionaries, migrants, and heroic individuals in the period before the Communist victory and political leaders, diplomats, and business people since then, the role of higher education is only starting to be recognized as a principal driver of connections between the two countries. Current efforts to market Canadian educational services are only one part of a much bigger story.

The role and significance of universities are increasing because of activities on campuses in both countries, but also because of partnerships, exchanges, and activities linking them. Rather than seeing universities solely as independent players with their own agendas, they need to be understood as a part of a larger effort led by national governments to cement a bilateral relationship that traverses two nations with very different histories, cultures, values, and political, social, and economic systems. From a Canadian perspective, cultivating university interest in China has been a central part of a broader strategy of engagement. While the Canadian government now plays a comparatively less-important role in shaping what the higher-educational sector does, academic activities have always been part of a larger political and diplomatic agenda in more than forty years of building a bilateral relationship. Here academic relations with China are unique. University collaborations are both the product of an engagement strategy and possibly its most durable and effective agent.

My aim is first to outline the thinking that lay behind the creation of the state-sponsored exchanges that began in 1970 and took on a new dimension with the large-scale programs funded by the federal government, principally the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), in the 1980s and 1990s. Government policies laid the foundation for these relationships to grow to the point where they now have a life of their own and involve almost every institution of higher learning in Canada and many in China. I will introduce the idea of "Partnerships 2.0" to frame the contemporary period in which the number of participating institutions, the levels of faculty and student exchange, the range of collaborative programs for teaching and research, the sources of funding, and the issues being faced have all shifted in substantial ways. Bilateral collaborations are a central node in a web of connections that show enormous potential and also raise a new set of challenges and questions.

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION

The university story begins with the missionaries, Canadian and otherwise, who helped establish institutions of higher learning in several parts of China in the late Imperial and Republican eras as part of their broader evangelical efforts. Very few if any of the missionaries studied China at Canadian universities before setting forth. Their era of building educational projects based on personal and church connections slowed with the war with Japan and ended with the creation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War. For the next twenty years there were occasional private visits by Canadian educators like Claude Bissell, but virtually no two-way flow of students or bilateral programming.[1] A few universities in Canada invested modestly in Chinese studies, with programs in language, the humanities, and social sciences like those at the University of Toronto (UT), McGill University, and the University of British Columbia (UBC). Returned missionaries and missionary offspring, the "mish-kids," provided much of the expertise in the halls of the academy and diplomacy. Canada's first three ambassadors to the PRC were born in China of missionary parents.

A new era began with the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1970. Universities and other non-governmental organizations became part of a governmental agenda for building a bilateral relationship. The foundation of this agenda was a strategy of engagement that has had three dimensions: economic, geo-strategic, and moral. Starting with Trudeau, successive governments have calculated that engagement is preferable to Cold War

containment, isolation, or confrontation; that Canada has both an opportunity and a comparative advantage in assisting China's development and bringing China into the international system; and that opening China economically would eventually induce political liberalization.

The distinctive feature of Canadian-style engagement was that it was not only expected to produce commercial advantages and diplomatic leverage but also to promote a value-driven agenda for changing China's domestic institutions or, in a more modest framing, influencing Chinese behaviour. While leavened by a search for mutual learning and understanding, most Canadians have held the idea that values including human rights and democracy are universals to which China should aspire and adapt.[2]

Universities were hard-wired in from the beginning. In building the infrastructure for engagement, an early priority was the creation of a bilateral agreement on scholarly cooperation. Signed by Prime Minister Trudeau and Premier Zhou Enlai in 1973, it put in place a mechanism for organizing and overseeing the selection of a small number of students and faculty to spend periods of time either studying or doing research in the other country.[3] The Canadian Embassy created a new position, the equivalent of a sinologist-in-residence, for an academic seconded for a period of time to assist with reporting and managing cultural and educational affairs. Before its termination in 2003, several of the dozen or so professors who held the position went on to play major administrative roles at universities across the country after they returned home.[4] The program strengthened and symbolized a unique connection between professors and diplomats not replicated in any other Canadian embassy. For twenty-five years, officials from the formerly named Department of External Affairs (DEA) not only worked with China specialists, but made special efforts to groom and consult them, including providing occasional funding for university appointments.

The DEA played an anchor role in incubating and managing academic contacts, working directly in some instances with individual professors and institutions, and coordinating with and encouraging other federal agencies and departments as well as provincial governments to provide various kinds of support. Because education is a matter of provincial jurisdiction, Canada does not have a federal ministry or organ responsible for coordinating and promoting international collaborations. Yet successive governments have had an interest in not just assisting but guiding educational and other non-governmental connections with China as part of an engagement policy. The DEA was the instrument for setting the institutional framework and tone.

In two detailed reports, the first published in 1986 and the second in 1996, Martin Singer has provided a very useful chronicle and assessment of Canadian academic relations with China in the twenty-five years after the establishment of diplomatic relations.[5] He breaks his history into four periods. I will add two more.

1970 to 1979

In addition to establishing the scholar and student exchange and the sinologist-in-residence programs, Ottawa worked with Beijing in creating a series of small-scale scientific and technical exchanges beginning in 1974 in fields including geology, oceanography, remote sensing, metallurgy, coal mining, railways, ports, agriculture, forestry, and fisheries. In July 1974, a first delegation of Canadian university presidents visited China, followed by a reciprocal visit of Chinese higher-educational officials in October 1975. A few students and faculty arranged private visits, but there were very limited opportunities for research or formal degree study. In a closed China, these early bilateral efforts opened a small window but not a door.

1979 to 1983

In June 1979, a bilateral agreement on academic exchanges was put in place that included a visiting-scholars program intended to bring mid-career Chinese academics to Canada for two years of non-degree studies, mainly in engineering and medicine, and to encourage new linkage agreements for the exchange of degree students and research scholars as organized by universities and colleges in both countries. According to Singer's estimate, about 400 Chinese academics visited Canada between 1970 and 1978 and more than 2,000 more in the next five years. Between 1970 and 1983, at least 600 Canadian academics visited China. Between 1970 and 1983, perhaps as many as 400 Canadian students visited China for academic purposes, about half of them in the formal Canada-China Student Exchange. By 1983, twenty-four Canadian universities had or were negotiating bilateral exchanges with Chinese counterparts. Universities across the country made a raft of appointments in Chinese studies, and several new centres for Chinese studies or research were established. The first centres for Canadian studies in China took root. Deng's Open Door policies and economic reforms increased China's need for outside expertise and technology, and were changing the landscape for international collaborations and exchanges.

1983 to 1989

The decision by the government of Canada to create a bilateral aid program opened a new chapter. Universities were a principal focus. Both the decision and the implementation were the product of close collaboration between CIDA and the DEA, conceived under the Liberal government and operationalized by a Progressive Conservative government that embraced a similar engagement strategy. The objective of the China program was to match Canadian capabilities to China's long-term development needs. In March 1982, the president of CIDA, Marcel Massé, outlined two distinctive features of the new program. The first was what he famously called the "multiplication of contacts at the thinking level." He stated, "Multiplication of contacts, that is how we should spend not only our money but also our administrative resources, multiplying them in a large number of fields, high technology preferably, but also methods of doing things, training trainers. We should help multiplying contacts in terms of the universities, but also maybe a number of small projects." Second, in training the trainers to develop new technologies, he argued that, "We can create the contacts, the understanding. We can create the contacts in terms of training trainers at levels where you have to deal with attitudes and values and where our people who are training will gain as much as they are giving." He also made the case that these could be more valuable to the Canadian economy in the long run than large-scale commercial contracts.[6] The bigger aim, as Fred Bild notes in chapter 3 of this volume, was not just benefiting Canada commercially but building a market economy in China.

For a little more than a decade, CIDA provided major financial support for several linkage projects focused on universities. The four main ones, which started shortly after 1983, were: (i) the Canada-China Language and Cultural Program ($23.5 million over ten years); (ii) the Canada-China Human Development Training Program ($30 million over twelve years); (iii) the Canada-China Management Education Project ($39.7 million over twelve years; see chapters 4, 5, and 6 of this volume); and (iv) the Canada-China University Linkage Program (CCULP) ($19 million over eight years; see chapter 1 and others in this volume).

In addition to the CIDA funding, the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) developed a program with the State Science and Technology Commission that over eight years contributed about $35 million to 145 China-based, China-related projects. Both the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) and the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council (NSERC) established

special programs with Chinese institutions. Four Canadian provinces – Quebec, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Ontario – established educational exchange arrangements with Chinese counterparts.

In quantitative terms, the results were formidable. Forty-five universities in Canada, thirty Chinese provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions, and 659 institutions across China were involved in CIDA-sponsored activities alone. Consonant with China's economic reform agenda, Chinese students could apply directly to Canadian institutions. Enrolment surged. By 1986, China was the principal source of international graduate students in Canada. By 1989, there were more than 200 university linkages, about half of which received IDRC or CIDA funding.

1990 to 1995

Unlike the events in Tahrir Square a generation later, the events in and around Tiananmen Square in June 1989 did not bring down a regime. They did, however, change the chemistry of the Canada-China relationship. Shock, anger, and a sense of betrayal were palpable. Political reform would not follow lockstep with the economic reforms begun a decade earlier. The Mulroney government expressed horror and outrage in describing what Foreign Minister Joe Clark called a "tragedy of global proportions." Ottawa put in place a package of targeted economic sanctions, deferred high-level exchanges, and delayed approval of three new CIDA-funded projects. But rather than reverse the broader strategy of engagement, it made an adjustment. "A poorer and more isolated China," stated Clark in August 1989, "is not in the broad interest of the Chinese people."[7]

The impact on the university sector was significant. Logistically, it proved difficult in the short term to continue with business as usual as officials and organizers assessed the fall-out. Though most of the professors and staff active in exchanges continued to believe in the value of their projects, a few lost faith that they were making a difference. The federal government's decision to adjust immigration policy to give a fast path to citizenship for all Chinese students in Canada at the time of the Tiananmen event, about 10,000 in total, exacerbated the concerns of Chinese administrators already concerned about the "non-return" problem. Three provinces – Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Ontario – suspended or let lapse their educational exchange programs.

CIDA began a rethinking of its approach. In part this reflected the view that the phase of major investment in university linkages had already reached a point of diminishing returns. It also reflected a new political

reality in Canada and demands by politicians and the public that the terms of engagement be altered. Almost immediately, CIDA began to emphasize the need for more in-China activities and short-term non-degree study programs in Canada. It began a longer-term shift away from universities as the principal vehicle for meeting its human-resource development objectives. This was made clear in its 1994 Country Development Policy Framework which emphasized a somewhat different set of priorities: economic cooperation, environmental sustainability, human rights, democratic development, and good governance. University-to-university linkages were almost all concluded by 1995 and replaced by projects that had "multi-stakeholder" results and support, and a wider array of executing agencies.

Individual universities and university-based activities continued to get support from CIDA throughout the 1990s. Reflective of the new approach, the largest and longest running project in the history of the bilateral program was launched in 1992, the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED). In addition, CIDA provided bridging support for programs that were continued by other means.

1995 to 2006

CIDA support for university-centred programs continued, though on a restricted scale. The Special University Linkage Consolidation Program (SUCLP) that succeeded the CCULP ran until 2001. It eventually supported eleven projects involving twenty-five Canadian and 200 Chinese universities, teaching hospitals, and schools. CIDA also provided funding for a variety of partnership arrangements in which universities played central roles, such as training programs for judges and lawyers related to its good governance and human rights foci. Others supported by the bilateral program or its regional program included a decade of workshop activity focused on Canada-China collaboration on regional security issues and institution building. Other CIDA-funded regional projects, such as the seven years of work on managing potential conflicts in the South China Sea, involved significant Chinese participation.

During this period, both the SSHRC and the NSERC of Canada altered and reduced funding for their China programs, concentrating on individual projects focused increasingly on research. The IDRC maintained an abiding focus on China, providing more than $52 million since 1981 for support of 240 activities.

By the time that prime minister Paul Martin and Chinese President Hu Jintao announced the strategic partnership between the two countries in September 2005, the role of Ottawa as funder, cheerleader, and leader in shaping and promoting academic activities was diminishing. This was not because of lessened interest in these activities but rather the calculation that they were well-launched. Chinese studies at Canadian universities were flourishing, the number of exchanges and collaborations multiplying, and the flow of Chinese students continuing to grow.

The coming to power of the Harper government in 2006 produced a significant shift in the whole approach to China. In its first three years of "cool politics, warm economics," it focused on trying to expand commercial relations with China while cooling the political relationship as part of its principled foreign policy defined by a credo of freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. In a significant policy shift in late 2009, words like "friendship," "engagement," and "strategic partnership" reappeared in speeches by the prime minister and his senior ministers. But engagement, Conservative-style, rested on different foundations that combined anti-communism, a belief in a smaller role for government, and a belief that the role of government is to facilitate transactions rather than build and lead relationships.

In practice this meant advocating human rights and democratic values while doing little by way of new programming in or with China to encourage them. It narrowed the focus of the bilateral program to environmental sustainability and human rights. It insisted that Canadian funds not support Chinese government officials or Party members. It terminated the aid program, effective March 2014, while finding alternative sponsorship for the CCICED with Environment Canada but not creating an alternative instrument for supporting other bilateral initiatives of strategic importance. China continued to remain eligible for CIDA support for humanitarian assistance and partnerships administered through international institutions such as the UN and the World Bank.

In the roughly thirty years of the bilateral program, CIDA contributed almost $250 million for activities focused on higher education.[8] CIDA was only one strand, albeit the best-resourced, in spinning a web of connections and activities focused on university linkages and partnerships. Several of the essays in this volume evaluate the results of the major projects that in the 1980s and 1990s held centre stage. Their accomplishments, legacies, and lessons are important. They helped establish personal and institutional networks, provided institutional memory, stimulated interest inside universities in both countries, and generated

research and teaching of mutual benefit. In some instances they generated ideas that clicked, sparking policy and commercial impact in both countries. And there is little question that they improved the lives of those who participated in them and those who benefited from their results in areas including agricultural protection and public health.

Marcel Massé's aspiration to multiply contacts at the thinking level was amply achieved. But have they contributed to the objective of fundamentally changing China or influencing Chinese behaviour? There is little debate in China or elsewhere that the efforts of Canadians and those of academics from many other countries have played instrumental roles in facilitating economic and social change in China, though only as one part of a complex blend of factors. As revealed in several of the chapters in this volume, the individuals who led the many programs of exchange prided themselves on not being imperialistic in outlook or expectations. They frequently use phrases like "mutual learning," "two-way understanding," and "trust," and point to both personal and institutional experiences that transformed their own research and teaching agendas and, to some extent, those of their home institutions. Almost all of them saw China advancing and changing, though not on a path to becoming more like the West but rather in adapting ideas and knowledge to its specific circumstances. Big ambitions for steering China in the direction of freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law have at best produced a zigzag effect with partial and indeterminate results.

The real value of university exchanges seems to have lain elsewhere. Universities are the point of intersection for building knowledge, deepening understanding, negotiating differences, and finding commonalities. Linkages and joint programming are part of their terrain, but even more fundamental is the teaching and critical thinking that takes place within them. Many questions remain to be answered. How has exposure to Canadian institutions affected the views of those Chinese students and professors who remained in Canada or have returned home? How have they affected the Canadian participants? Have these interactions spawned common or shared new ideas related to humane and democratic governance, social justice, or environmental sustainability?

CONTEMPORARY SETTING

China is no longer "over there"; it is an integral part of campus life across the country. It is the domain of a much larger group of students and professors than those who are China specialists. Gone are the days when

Professor X was *the* "China person" or *the* "China scholar" known across campus. Great individuals still exist and still are needed. But the era of great individuals has passed. In Canada, it is the institutions, the universities themselves, sometimes in cooperation with the federal and provincial governments, which are the key drivers.

The activities of universities are larger, more intricate, more vibrant, and more multi-layered than its diplomat architects of the 1970s could have foretold in an era of a closed China and a sometimes complacent Canadian university scene. They include many hundreds, probably thousands, of faculty visits in each direction every year, dozens of jointly organized workshops and conferences, about 100,000 Chinese students enrolled in Canadian institutions, around 3,890 Canadian students in Chinese institutions, exchanges, experiential learning opportunities, collaborative teaching and supervision, summer institutes, centres of Chinese studies across Canada, centres for Canadian studies in China, Confucius Institutes (on some campuses), and alumni networks. A large number of universities now offer courses on China as part of their permanent curriculum. Several teach the Chinese language, and some have extensive course offerings in the humanities and social sciences focused on Chinese studies. Several have China strategies as part of their international programming. Professors at most institutions have constructed a bewildering number of collaborations in research and teaching with partners in China.

Universities in the two countries are partnering with each other for a diverse set of purposes, by multiple means, and on an increasing scale. They are collaborating with Chinese partners other than universities, including research institutes, government ministries, Party schools, NGOs, and corporate entities. Sources of funding have diversified, with the majority of support, financial and entrepreneurial, for two-way movements of students as well as faculty and bilateral collaborations coming from Chinese rather than Canadian sources. The Chinese sources include international student fees paid privately, scholarships provided by the Chinese government, especially the China Scholarship Council (CSC), support from local and provincial governments, and private and corporate gifts. Governments continue to play significant roles. Doors that they have opened are not guaranteed to stay open. On the Chinese side, ministries in Beijing fund scholarships, exchanges, and visits. On the Canadian side, Ottawa plays a continuing role in providing the infrastructure for interactions, including providing information, continuing to support a small bilateral exchange program, issuing visas,

and helping Canadian universities with recruitment and the marketing of Canadian educational services. Ottawa does provide a small amount of support for special collaborations, especially in science and technology. But the vast proportion of energy, funding, and dynamism comes from the institutions themselves.

Three broad forces shape the dynamics of university-centred exchanges and activities. First, the societal roles played by universities in both countries are changing rapidly. In Canada, the defining feature is a growing emphasis on research, an increasing amount of it connected to commercialization, direct economic benefit, and policy-related matters. Almost all remain public institutions, independently governed but funded heavily by provincial governments and, indirectly, from the federal government through support for research and scholarships. In China, the quest is for creating world-class universities, incubating research, and attracting international and internationally trained talent in an era of staggering expansion. As noted in one recent study, in 1978 Chinese universities enrolled about 860,000 students; in 1990 about two million; in 2000 about six million; and in 2013 about thirty million. In 2000 there were about half as many students enrolled in Chinese universities as in American universities. Fourteen years later, the number of Chinese students studying at Chinese universities is twice as large. That number is expected to double again within twenty years.[9]

Second, China is now a central component of the international strategies of most Canadian institutions of higher learning. Some of this focuses on marketing Canadian educational services and recruiting qualified Chinese students. Increasingly, it focuses on partnering with Chinese universities for purposes of increasing the global competitiveness and quality of our own institutions. Some professors and administrators are drawn to China for reasons of ethnic heritage, intellectual and cultural curiosity, and the fact that China is the object of their study. Far more are now drawn because it is a significant part of their professional interest. To be successful in their professional fields, in doing the most important research and teaching possible, partnerships with China are increasingly seen not as a luxury but a necessity. Building relationships is now essential for serious research and teaching about China and work with Chinese partners. The aim of building capacity in Chinese institutions remains significant but is no longer the principal or dominant aim. Rather, the aim is two-way partnerships. In less than a generation, university linkages have shifted from training and helping Chinese to solve their problems to working with them for mutual advantage,

something described as "collaboration on equal footing." In fields like medicine and public health, Chinese institutions may be twenty years behind, but the trend line is impressive.

Third, significant asymmetries and differences remain in the scale and organization of the university sector, governance systems, and surrounding political structures. Individual institutions in both countries are fiercely competitive. One of the major differences is that the Chinese government is far more directive and strategic in setting priorities and organizing around them. Decision-making and priority-setting is far more decentralized in Canada. Only a few institutions have campus-wide China strategies, deep collaboration between universities is rare even in the same city or province, and at the federal level the constitutional division of powers plus the Conservative aversion to national strategies of any sort makes for a largely uncoordinated scene. In many areas, China's political and academic leaders know better where they want to go, and have clearer strategies and priorities than their Canadian counterparts.

CASE EXAMPLE: THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (UBC)

UBC may be distinctive in the length, scale, depth, and breadth of its China connections, the city in which it is located with enormous links to greater China, and its geographic location as a port on the Pacific. Yet the scope and nature of its current interactions with China are far from unique. They give us some clues as to what is happening and what comes next on a national scale.

Compare 1986 and 2011. The information collected in the 1986 study by Martin Singer indicates that between 1970 and 1983, UBC annually hosted roughly ten visiting scholars from China, six graduate students, about the same number of privately sponsored undergraduates, and one visiting delegation. It negotiated exchange agreements with five Chinese partners, and on average seven or eight faculty members travelled to China each year.

Twenty-five years later, about 3,000 students from the PRC are currently enrolled in undergraduate programs at the university, with a further 600 in graduate programs, and more than 100 in post-doctoral positions; scores of Chinese professors visit each year for short or longer term stays; UBC faculty, senior administration, and staff make several hundred visits to China each year; and the university has Memorandums

of Understanding (MoUs) with fifty different institutions and functioning partnerships in more than ninety locations.

In 2010 and 2011, UBC conducted campus-wide surveys to assess the breadth and nature of the Asian activities of its professors.[10] Commissioned by a "China Strategy Working Group" composed of twelve faculty members from units across campus who met for a year to produce a report for senior administration, the surveys were complemented by interviews with several members of faculty and staff.[11] The key findings paint an interesting picture:

- 425 professors completed the survey and self-identified as having "a significant professional interest" in Asia. About half of them identified China as their principal interest, roughly three quarters focused on the mainland, and about a quarter noted exclusive or additional attention to Hong Kong and Taiwan.
- The largest number of professors interested in China is in the Faculty of Arts but with significant numbers in forestry and wood science, engineering and applied sciences, education, medicine, and nursing. In total, there were respondents from more than fifty different departments, schools, and units.
- More than sixty faculty members focus on China as their principal field of study, the large majority concentrated in the Faculty of Arts.
- About one third identified teaching and training as their principal interest in China. More than two thirds indicated they were teaching students from China. Less than a quarter were engaged in teaching UBC students about China. Slightly more were engaged in teaching or training professionals from China and a slightly higher number yet (about 25 per cent) involved in teaching or training Chinese in China.
- More than three quarters identified research about China as a principal interest.
- About two thirds identified having research collaborations with individuals in China and about 40 per cent were involved in formal institutional partnerships with Chinese universities. More than a third identified having collaborations with industry, government ministries and research institutes, and non-governmental organizations. The total number of different partnering institutions was more than ninety.
- Most of the research projects and collaborations are centred in the social sciences and humanities. But the biggest funding is in the areas of medicine, public health, engineering, applied sciences, and

business. One project based in the Faculty of Medicine ($100 million over ten years) is about equal to the sum of annual research support in all of the social sciences and humanities combined.
- The funding for scholarships and exchange funds provided as part of the Canada-China scholarly exchange program is considerably less than 1 per cent of the total. Funds provided by the national granting councils were difficult to calculate but probably comprise about an additional 15–20 per cent.

The working group made several recommendations including: the creation of a China Council to support, catalyze, and coordinate university-wide activities;[12] establishment of a representative office in Beijing; re-design of the Centre for Chinese Research and Institute of Asian Research; support for new faculty appointments to fill gaps and imbalances in course offerings especially in key policy areas including environment, energy, natural resources, public health, and public policy; exploration of ways to generate new forms of teaching and research collaborations with Chinese partners; assessment of ways to get more UBC students to China for exchange programs, summer institutes and experiential learning opportunities; expanded recruitment of top students, especially at the graduate and post-doctoral levels; and work to resolve the complicated ethical, moral, and value-based problems inherent in the deeper interaction of different intellectual and political systems.

The experience of UBC and other institutions in Canada indicates that we are now in a different era in which the defining characteristics are: a far more diverse set of academic champions; more diverse constellations of partners on both sides, including universities but not restricted to them; diversified sources of funding; cross-campus coordination as part of "whole of university" arrangements; collaborations with multi-university consortia; prospects for representative offices in China or, more ambitiously, permanent facilities for offering courses, facilitating research, or giving degrees or certificates.

Four areas are especially important in constructing a next generation of what might be called Partnerships 2.0.

Student Recruitment and Exchange

Increasing effort is needed to connect student activity, especially at the graduate and post-doctoral levels, to collaborative teaching and research programs. The aim is to facilitate long-term collaborations through

mechanisms including 1+3+1 undergraduate collaborations, and 1+2 joint degree graduate programs directly connected to faculty-led research activity. More resources will be needed for improving student satisfaction and tracking and connecting to individuals after graduation. Joint appointments between Canadian and Chinese universities are being considered and pilot programs on dual doctoral programs soon to be launched. Whether or not Canadian universities establish campuses in China, the contribution they can make to China is through returned and transnational graduates working in both Canada and China as well as helping with the innovation agendas in both countries.

Chinese Studies

Almost every China specialist has active and ongoing collaborations with scholars and institutions in China or is involved in international networks in which China is a focus or has Chinese participants. China is no longer a place studied from its periphery and by telescopes. Rather than an exotic thing apart, it is an integral part of a global conversation. When graduate students are working on a specific field, like the history of China, they can no longer miss out on the global perspective or close collaboration with Chinese counterparts. The new scholarship is producing dramatic advances in our knowledge of China.[13] That said, universities are only one of the places where the new knowledge is being generated. News agencies, media, private research firms, and government agencies are producing kinds of analysis and information that may well have more reach and impact than what universities are producing alone. The best universities in the world are generating innovative programs for helping China scholars better engage policy and applied issues and serve as hubs and partners with other knowledge generators.

Multi-Sectoral Collaborations

While independent, curiosity-based research remains central to the academic mission, China specialists are being called to work as part of interdisciplinary teams and on problem-based topics including population health, environmental protection, and the provision of social services. These collaborations are necessary but difficult, even within individual institutions. In many parts of the university including forestry, medicine and public health, engineering, and education, partnerships are already more complex than simple university-to-university linkages. Some of the

most successful are tri- or multi-sectoral arrangements that involve universities and other kinds of institutions including think tanks, government ministries, NGOs, and the private sector. One example is a project at UBC on regional security issues in East Asia co-hosted by UBC and a research institute in Shanghai, involving academics from four Canadian and five Chinese institutions, including participation of officials from the two foreign ministries, and funded by a private Canadian corporation.

Navigating Value and Institutional Differences

These are becoming more numerous and more important as the level of interaction increases. Academic values, norms, and practices are not identical and occasionally collide. Growing trade, investment, human flows, and academic exchanges have punctured the national boundaries separating contrasting value systems. Never before has the Chinese state been more active in attempting to increase China's soft power and projecting Chinese values overseas, including through Chinese language media and surveillance, especially of individuals of Chinese descent, and state-controlled programs like the Confucius Institutes. Several Canadian universities have had intense internal debates, and occasionally public ones, about the Confucius Institutes as well as matters of academic freedom, openness of expression, and research ethics related to issues like consent. It is going to be an ongoing challenge demanding sensitivity and open dialogue to manage these matters and to underwrite sustained and deeper partnerships.

This will become even more challenging if, as other essays in this volume argue, the next frontier in Chinese higher education is deeper collaboration in the humanities and liberal arts. So far as education is about educating the whole person and inculcating an approach that combines curiosity, critical thinking, reflective and sceptical thought, and a capacity for life-long learning, there is a more complicated era ahead. Mutual learning will be essential but not easy as is being seen in other Asian experiments, including the new collaboration in the humanities between the National University of Singapore and Yale University.

CONCLUSION

Most of these challenges will need to be met by the universities themselves, alone or working together. But they will also need support from actors beyond the university, especially federal and provincial governments. In part

this is because the Chinese state continues to be the driving force in setting the pace and direction of Chinese educational policy and providing the funding for most of the major initiatives, even as private educational institutions are emerging in China and new foreign campuses and joint ventures are springing up in several parts of the country. In part it is also because all of Canada's G-7 and G-20 partners have national programs and national strategies for expanding academic relations with China.

On the Canadian side, in the absence of a national educational ministry in Ottawa, funding for strategic initiatives, showcase projects, and policy-related collaborations remain essential. The conclusion of the bilateral aid program without provision for alternative funding is a serious handicap. There is no need to reprise the linkage projects of the past. What is needed is matching funds for a small number of strategic initiatives, show case projects, and policy-related collaborations. Contrary to the transactional view of a strictly limited and diminishing role for government in the Canada-China relationship, governments still have the capacity to structure incentives, coordinate, convene and, perhaps again, inspire. At the same time, hundreds of educational institutions from countries other than Canada are also competing to build their own linkages, often with substantial governmental encouragement and funding.

The emerging challenge confronting Canadian academic relations with China and the engagement philosophy which they reflect may be the rise of negative views of China in the general public. Canadians see China as big and getting bigger, two thirds of them feeling that within a decade Chinese power will surpass that of the United States. At the same time they are growing increasingly anxious about Chinese business practices, environment, food and product safety standards, defence modernization, and human rights.[14]

Learning to live with global China is proving more complex than living with China of the Maoist period. Getting China right will depend in large part on the expertise, understanding, and relentless interactions that have no better home than universities. Whether Partnerships 2.0 can unfold at the speed and at the scale they are needed depends on whether they can communicate their role and achievements in a context where publics are increasingly anxious. "Nothing in international cooperation is more precious," writes Fred Bild in chapter 3 of this volume, "than sustained contacts in all of fields of learning and research" (xx). Even if this is correct, Partnerships 2.0 will be judged by whether they are seen to produce a larger societal and global good consonant with an evolving strategy of engagement.

NOTES

1 On the Bissell visit, see Macdonald (2010).
2 For the history of the role of educational exchanges as part of the governmental agenda and, later, the rising tide of non-governmental interactions, see Evans (2014).
3 The professorial exchange was launched in 1974, soon terminated, and then resumed in 1977, initially with a heavy emphasis on sending Canadian language teachers to China.
4 The memoir of one of them who later became vice-president international at the University of Alberta, Professor Brian Evans, contains a colourful account of the roles and frustrations of the position. See Evans (2012, 113–85).
5 See Singer (1986, 1996).
6 CIDA files, quoted by Frolic (1996) in his paper presented at the Canadian Political Science Association. Frolic draws heavily on a paper presented by Maybee (1985) at the Conference on Canada-China Relations, in Montebello, Quebec.
7 As quoted in Evans (2014, 40–2).
8 A figure quoted by Qiang Zha (2011, 101).
9 Abrami, Kirby, and McFarlan 2014.
10 The 2011 census compiles results from the 2010 and 2011 surveys. The results, including a map of the locations where UBC faculty have partners, can be found at http://www.iar.ubc.ca/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=59Kcv2HjUZw per cent3d&tabid=618.
11 The working group addressed four sets of issues: (1) what could be done to promote excellence in research, teaching, and experiential learning in Chinese studies, already a core foundation of UBC's international reputation and identity; (2) what could be done to facilitate next-generation linkages and exchanges with partners in China and expand two-way flows of faculty and students; (3) what could be done to advance UBC's role as global educator and contributor of public goods for its provincial, national, and global communities; and (4) what could be the design of a new administrative infrastructure for UBC in China and on campus better to stimulate, advocate, and assist China-related activities? The final report, "A Next-Generation China Strategy for the University of British Columbia," was submitted to the vice-president research and international on 11 May 2012.
12 Information about the Council is available at www.chinacouncil.ubc.ca.

13 For a recent survey of the state of Chinese studies in Canada, see Manning (2012). While decrying the atomization of scholarship, she chronicles the rise in the number of China specialists and their contributions.

14 See the series of annual national opinion polls produced by the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, the most recent in June 2014. The results are available at https://www.asiapacific.ca/surveys/national-opinion-polls/2014-national-opinion-poll-canadian-views-asia.